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 The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of
 'Implied Repeals:' A Requiem for
 Indigenous Treaty Rights
 by DAVID E. WILKINS*
 INTRODUCTION
 America's indigenous nations occupy a distinctive political/legal sta-
 tus within the United States as separate sovereigns whose rights are based
 in the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty, affirmed in hundreds of rati-
 fied treaties and agreements, acknowledged in the Commerce Clause of
 the U.S. Constitution, and recognized in ample federal legislation and
 case law. Ironically, while indigenous sovereignty is neither constitution-
 ally defined or delimited, it may be restricted or enhanced by federal law.
 One could argue, then, that indeterminacy or inconsistencyl is a hallmark
 of the tribal-federal political/legal relationship.
 THE POWER TO ABROGATE INDIAN TREATIES:
 CONGRESS OR THE COURTS?
 Much scholarly attention has focused on the question of what
 prompted and serves to perpetuate this indeterminacy. That is, why has
 the federal government been unable to maintain a consistent policy orien-
 tation either favoring the breakup of tribes and the assimilation of Indians,
 *David E. Wilkins, a member of the Lumbee Nation, is an Associate Professor of
 American Indian Studies, Political Science and Law at the University of Minnesota/Twin
 Cities. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North
 Carolina/Chapel Hill, in 1990.
 1. Evidence of federal indeterminacy in how to administer Indian tribes and their mem-
 bers is abundant. For example, are tribes "distinct, independent communities" capable of
 exercising a measure of external sovereign power (Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
 515 (1832) and Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835), or are they merely
 "domestic-dependent nations" limited to wielding a reduced degree of internal sovereignty
 (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)?
 Do tribal nations enjoy a uniquely "political" relationship with the federal government
 (Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), or is their relationship with the U.S. based on
 majority-minority race relations theory (See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
 567 (1846), United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909), and United States v. Nice, 241
 U.S. 591 (1916)?
 Or, are general acts of Congress inapplicable to tribes unless they are specifically written
 into the legislation (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884), or are tribes subject to congres-
 sional enactments unless they are specifically exempted (The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 (11
 Wall.) 616 (1871)?
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 or respecting tribal national sovereignty.2 This is a weighty and compre-
 hensive political, legal, economic, geographical, and moral question and I
 will not answer it here. My attention is narrower and more institutionally
 focused. I am specifically interested in understanding the role of the U.S.
 Supreme Court in its efforts to quash or dramatically modify Indian treaty
 rights without congressional authorization or tribal consent. The question
 this essay proposes to answer is this: Does the power to abrogate, termi-
 nate, or modify Indian treaties/agreements rest solely with the political
 branches-that is, with Congress or the President-or does the Supreme
 Court have the constitutional right to "impliedly" abrogate Indian treaties?
 I argue, and the evidence bears out, that the power to abrogate or
 modify Indian treaties (or agreements), or provisions of these documents,
 may only be exercised by the Congress3 and then only after the legislative
 branch has expressly and unequivocally stated its intent to alter or annul
 the diplomatic arrangement between the U.S. and a particular tribal
 nation. I contend that when the Supreme Court hands down opinions
 which impliedly sever specific Indian treaty rights, and does so absent a
 specific legislative mandate directing the termination of the treaty right,
 that the Court has vastly overstepped its juridical power, is violating the
 federal Constitution, and is acting contrary to the acknowledged trust rela-
 tionship4 to tribes which holds that the U.S. has not only the legal but a
 2. See Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle's, The Nations Within: The Past and
 Future of American Indian Sovereignty, with Clifford M. Lytle (New York: Pantheon
 Books, 1984); Nell Jessup Newton, "Let A Thousand Policy-Flowers Bloom: Making Indian
 Policy in the Twenty-First Century," Arkansas Law Review, vol. 46 (1993): 25-75; and
 Joanne Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity
 and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
 3. In Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct. 1187), handed down
 March 24, 1999, the Court in a 5-4 ruling upheld the Chippewa's 1837 treaty right to hunt,
 fish, and gather on 13 million acres of land the eight Chippewa Bands ceded to the federal
 government in central Minnesota. In upholding these treaty rights, Justice O'Connor reiterat-
 ed that "Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to
 do so." Quoting from United States v. Dion (1986), O'Connor stated that "there must be
 clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on
 the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abro-
 gating the treaty." There is," said O'Connor, "no such 'clear evidence' of congressional
 intent to abrogate the Chippewa Treaty rights here."
 4. I agree with the definition of trust which holds that the federal government is under the
 legal and moral obligation to protect Indian lands, waters, minerals, and all other natural
 resources and is also obligated to protect and encourage tribal self-government, to assist the
 tribes in their movement towards economic independence, and to provide social programs
 and services to raise the standard of living of Indian people to a level comparable to what the
 majority enjoys (See, U.S. Congress, American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final
 Report, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977): p. 136. The trust
 relationship, however, is not and cannot be not uniform across tribes. No two tribal entities
 enjoy the exact same relationship with the federal government because of variations centered
 around when and why a tribe first established its political relationship with a European
 power (typically Spain, France, or Great Britain) or with the United States; what the relative
 strengths or weaknesses of the tribal nation were at the time it negotiated its relationship and
 whether these shifted across time; and in whether or not a treaty basis exists between the two
 parties.
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 moral duty to assist tribes by protecting their lands, resources, sovereign-
 ty, and cultural heritage.
 The judicial doctrine of implied repeals of politically created treaty
 arrangements is an invalid and unwarranted exercise of power not sanc-
 tioned by the Constitution or the distinctive political relationship between
 tribes and the federal government. Even when there is an alleged conflict
 between a preexisting treaty right and a later congressional or state
 statute, the courts, because of the trust doctrine and the good faith test,
 must, in the absence of a specific repealing or terminating statute, uphold
 the federal government's treaty obligations to tribes. The principal task of
 the Supreme Court in sorting out alleged irreconcilable differences
 between treaty provisions and statutory provisions should be to uphold the
 treaty and to interpret the statute in conformity with the context in which
 the treaty was negotiated.
 WHAT IS IMPLIED REPEAL?
 (A.K.A. REPEAL BY IMPLICATION)
 By "implied" I mean an action by the court when the intention in
 regard to the subject matter is not manifested by explicit and direct words,
 but is gathered by implication or deduction from the circumstances, the
 general language, or the conduct of one or both of the parties. By "repeal"
 I mean the abrogation of a previously existing law or treaty by another
 measure that contains provisions perceived to be so contrary to or irrecon-
 cilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two can stand in
 force. The conjunction of the two terms leads to a definition of implied
 repeal which means the superseding of an existing law, rule, or treaty pro-
 vision without an express directive to that effect.
 This doctrine is of critical importance for tribal nations whose col-
 lective sovereign rights and some individual Indian rights generally hinge
 on treaties. This issue also is significant for American democracy because
 it raises questions of non-discrimination, consent, and self-determination,
 as well as justice, fairness, and respect for the rule of law. And any dis-
 cussion of implied repeals of necessity warrants some discussion of how
 the courts ascertain congressional intent. This is an especially salient point
 for federal Indian policy because Congress, via the Commerce Clause, has
 exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the federal government's
 affairs with tribes.
 The political/legal doctrine of "good faith," a close corollary to the
 trust doctrine, first articulated by the Congress in the 1787 Northwest
 Ordinance, succinctly states that the federal government would always
 observe "the utmost good faith towards the Indians, their lands and prop-
 erty shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
 property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed,
 unless in just the lawful wars authorised [sic] by Congress; but laws
 founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for pre-
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 venting wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friend-
 ship with them .... "5
 Any sovereign nation retains the power to unilaterally abrogate its
 treaty commitments, although since treaties are diplomatic arrangements
 between two or more nations, formal unilateral abrogations occur with the
 realization that the result might be a declaration of war by the other treaty
 signatories or international embarrassment before the family of nations. In
 the case of the U.S., the congressional power to abrogate, as Wilkinson
 and Volkman rightly noted,6 "is based on the notion that a treaty repre-
 sents the political policy of the nation at the time it was made. If there is a
 change of circumstances and the national interest accordingly 'demands' a
 modification of its terms, then Congress may abrogate a treaty in whole or
 in part."7
 While agreeing that treaties are political arrangements which may be
 abrogated by either treaty party, and specifically that from the federal
 government's perspective it falls to Congress to be the nullifying agent, I
 disagree with Wilkinson and Volkman's later contention that "[t]here are
 so many tests for determining whether an abrogation has been effected,
 and most of them are so vague, that a court has little recourse but to arrive
 at an ad hoc, almost arbitrary decision when faced with the question of
 whether a particular treaty guarantee has been abrogated by Congress."8
 Wilkinson and Volkman vest in the Supreme Court an amount of
 political power and policymaking leeway not authorized by Article III of
 the U.S. Constitution, which contradicts much prior judicial precedent, is
 contrary to the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, and which directly opposes
 federal Indian policy which recognizes that Congress has the exclusive
 authority to regulate the federal government's affairs with tribes, includ-
 ing the power to alter the nation's will-as evidenced in treaties-towards
 tribes. Furthermore, since Congress is the principal agent responsible for
 overseeing the United States' exercise of its trust obligations towards
 tribes, in the event that the trust is to be terminated or modified it falls to
 the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, to make such alterations.
 I believe this position is defensible throughout the history of treaty
 relations between the U.S. and tribes, but that it was made more com-
 pelling after 18719 when Congress unilaterally stopped negotiating
 treaties with tribes, thus precluding Indian nations, who remained outside
 the U.S. Constitution's pale, from that important form of negotiation. And
 since tribes, qua tribes, lack congressional representation, and tribal rights
 are based largely on inherent sovereignty and treaties/agreements, and are
 5. 1 Stat., 50.
 6. "Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass
 Grows Upon the Earth'-How Long a Time is That?" California Law Review, vol. 63
 (1975): 601-61.
 7. Ibid., p. 604.
 8. Ibid., p. 608.
 9. 16 Stat., 544, 566.
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 not grounded in the U.S. Constitution, this is all the more reason for the
 courts to uphold the extant treaty rights absent an explicit congressional
 directive to the contrary or a mutually agreed upon decision between a
 tribe and the U.S. to modify the basis of their political relationship.
 Finally, American Indians gradually became naturalized as
 American citizens (both state and federal, which were layered onto their
 tribal citizenship) via treaty provisions, land allotments, and specific
 statutory measures. This layering of multiple citizenships, in conjunction
 with the ongoing federal trust doctrine, meant that a congressional deci-
 sion to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaty rights would normally occur
 only in the event of compelling national reasons (i.e., Indian land cessions
 for the expanding Euro-American presence) and sometimes with the
 direct concurrence of a tribe. The Supreme Court, charged, among other
 things, with upholding the Constitution, the laws, and "all treaties made"
 as the supreme law of the land, is required to closely examine any con-
 flicts and finding no direct congressional intent to abrogate an Indian
 treaty should not presume it has the authority to impliedly repeal the
 same.
 The policies of tribal self-determination10 and self-governance,11
 inaugurated in the early 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, point
 toward a federal policy orientation bent on recognizing the semi-sover-
 eign cultural, political, and economic rights of tribal nations to function
 with an increasingly greater measure of political independence. There is
 firm evidence, however, that since the late 1980s, as the United States
 Supreme Court turned more conservative, it has veered away from the
 congressional policy of tribal self-determination and is rendering opinions
 that harken back to the nineteenth-century policy of overt assimilation and
 acculturation.12 And since the ascendance of the Republican Party to
 power in both houses of Congress in 1994, the Congress has also become
 more conservative. Legislative conservatism, augmented by the resurgent
 ideology of states' rights, threatens tribal economic growth, political
 development, and social progress as tribes have to compete with states for
 a share of federal dollars, or, in some cases, tribal governments are
 required to seek funding directly from states when Congress devolves
 funds for certain programs to the states under block grants.13 Hence, the
 tribal situation is more precarious in the 1990s because tribes face legisla-
 tive and judicial assaults on their treaty rights.
 10. 88 St. 2203.
 11. 108 St. 4250, see, especially Title II "Self-Governance."
 12. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Braids of Feathers (Berkeley: University of
 California Press, 1995); and David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S.
 Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997). But see,
 Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct. 1187 (1999) and Puget Sound
 Shellfish Growers v. United States (1999 U.S. Lexis 2504) (1999), two decisions which
 upheld the treaty rights of tribes in Minnesota and Washington State.
 13. David E. Wilkins, "GOP May Railroad Indian Interests," Arizona Daily Star
 (November 27, 1994), sec. f, p. 2.
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 POLICYMAKING BY THE SUPREME COURT:
 MAJORITY OR JUSTICE
 The issue of the Supreme Court's policymaking role was argued
 well by Robert Dahl, a political scientist, in a classic article written nearly
 forty years ago.14 Dahl asserted that in determining the extent to which
 the Supreme Court makes policy decisions, it is important to understand
 whether the Court goes outside established "legal" criteria found in past
 precedent, statutes, and the Constitution. In this respect, the Supreme
 Court occupies a distinctive position because it is an important character-
 istic of the Supreme Court that on occasion its members are required to
 render decisions "where legal criteria are not in any realistic sense ade-
 quate to the task."15 In other words, cases sometimes come before the
 Court involving alternatives about which there are profound disagree-
 ments in society-abortion, desegregation, drug use and regulation, crimi-
 nal and victims' rights, religious issues-that is to say, the setting of the
 case is clearly "political."
 Historically, this was certainly true of Indian issues. The Court has
 occasionally acted contrary to congressional policy, administrative direc-
 tion, and public sentiment in rendering Indian law decisions. Examples
 are Worcester v. Georgial6 (1832-State law is inferior to Indian treaty
 law), Ex parte Crow Dogl7 (1883-tribes have criminal jurisdiction over
 their own members), Matter of Heffl8 (1905-Indians who become natu-
 ralized as American citizens have the right to drink liquor), and Choate v.
 Trappl9 (1912)-Indian allottees are exempt from state taxation), to name
 but a few. Nevertheless, in the area of treaty abrogation, I argue that the
 Supreme Court exceeds its constitutional authority when it relies on the
 doctrine of implied repeal to explicitly abrogate Indian treaty rights since
 a treaty is a formal political arrangement between two or more sovereign
 entities. They are negotiated by designated individuals and ratified by the
 nations of the participatory powers. Hence, as political agreements, it fol-
 lows that the power to abrogate should be wielded solely by the branch
 constitutionally empowered to act.
 In determining the role of the Court, Dahl argued that two very
 different, conflicting criteria are sometimes used. These are the majority
 criterion and the criterion of right or justice. The majority criterion refers
 to the fact that every conflict in society invariably is a dispute between a
 majority of those eligible to participate and a minority or minorities, or
 else it is a dispute between or among minorities only. Thus the outcome
 14. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,"
 Journal of Public Law, vol. 6 (1957): 279-295.
 15. Ibid., p. 280.
 16. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
 17. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
 18. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
 19. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
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 of the court's decisions must either (1) accord with the preferences of a
 minority--counter to those of a majority; (2) accord with the preferences
 of a majority--counter to those of a minority; or (3) accord with the pref-
 erences of one minority, counter to another minority.20
 For example, Dahl discussed the popular view that the Supreme
 Court's primary role is to protect the rights of minorities against the tyran-
 ny of the majority. His analysis of data (he examined decisions where the
 Court declared portions of federal legislation unconstitutional) in the
 1950s, however, showed that, in fact, "the policy views dominant on the
 Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant
 among the lawmaking majorities of the United States."21
 In other words, Dahl found that "the evidence is not impressive" that
 the Court has protected fundamental or natural rights and liberties against
 the tyranny of some lawmakers. Of course, as Jonathan Casper would
 later show,22 Dahl's article was written during an era of national political
 repression (e.g., fear of communism) and before the Warren Court had
 settled in and begun to render decisions favoring fundamental rights of
 minorities against tyrannical or indifferent majorities. Casper also correct-
 ly chided Dahl for his exclusion of data-he did not examine cases
 involving statutory construction or cases arising out of state and local leg-
 islation-and for his reliance on a policy framework that was rooted in
 influence or power. This winners and losers approach, Casper asserted,
 "imposes an artificial distinction that obscures a dynamic process in
 which even 'losers' contribute importantly to outcomes that eventually
 emerge."23 Nevertheless, although Casper's 1976 article identified some
 central flaws in Dahl's arguments and data, a reexamination of Dahl's
 larger thesis and an emphasis on his second approach, the justice criterion,
 still has merit.
 The criterion of right or justice, according to Dahl, holds that the
 most important policy function of the Court is to protect rights that are
 considered basic or fundamental. The Constitution, in other words,
 assumes an underlying fundamental body of rights and liberties, which the
 Court guarantees by its decisions. Dahl found that except for short-lived
 transitional periods, the Supreme Court was inevitably a part of the domi-
 nant national alliance and generally supported the major policies of that
 alliance. The main task of the Court, he said, was to confer legitimacy on
 the fundamental policies of the political branches and also, more broadly,
 on the basic patterns of behavior required for the operation of democracy.
 Dahl recognized, and the evidence vividly shows, that the Court is
 not simply an agent of the dominant ruling alliance. In fact, the Supreme
 Court has real power bases of its own, the most important of which is the
 20. Ibid., p. 281-282.
 21. Ibid., p. 285.
 22. "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," American Political Science
 Review, vol. 70, no. 1 (March 1976): 50-63.
 23. Ibid., p. 62.
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 distinctive legitimacy extended to the court's interpretations of the
 Constitution. The evidence in Indian law bears out this claim. There are
 more than a few cases, which Dahl would categorize as justice cases, in
 which the Supreme Court has rendered powerful rulings supporting tribal
 rights and sovereignty, even when the exercise of that sovereignty clashes
 with majority sentiment.24
 However, when analyzing the entire history of the court, on balance,
 one finds that the bulk of the law pronounced by the court, as Shattuck
 and Norgren put it, "has not been 'a better way' for Indians."25 While not-
 ing Indian legal gains, they found that those gains "are never final nor are
 they secure from political manipulation."26
 The Rehnquist Court is openly supportive of the major-majoritari-
 an-policies of the dominant national alliance, policies which generally
 do not reflect positively on the distinctive extraconstitutional role of tribes
 in the American polity. The Rehnquist Court, at least insofar as tribes are
 concerned, has adopted the majority criterion as its major policy perspec-
 tive, and relies much less on the justice criterion when it decides to hear
 Indian related cases. The reinvigorated doctrine of implied repeal bears
 this out.
 THE COURT AND "POLITICAL" QUESTIONS
 Under Article 3, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme
 Court's power is said to extend to "all cases, in law and equity, arising
 under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
 which shall be made, under their authority ... " Despite this seemingly
 clear authority to hear cases involving treaties, the Supreme Court has fre-
 quently declined to rule on matters involving treaties by claiming that
 those agreements were "political questions" that should be resolved by the
 political branches. The political question doctrine means what the justices
 say it means. The doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137
 (1803)), when Chief Justice Marshall said that "the province of the Court
 is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals. . ... Questions in their
 nature political, or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to
 the executive can never be made in this Court."27 Similarly, as the court
 held in The Chinese Exclusion Cases (130 U.S. 581 (1889)), "the question
 whether our government is justified in disregarding its engagements with
 another nation is not one of determination of the courts" (p. 602).
 Additional rulings have elaborated on other reasons for the political
 24. See, e.g., Worcester (1832), Crow Dog (1883), and Choate v. Trapp (1912).
 25. Petra T. Shattuck and Jill Norgren, Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal
 Constitution System (Providence, R.I.: Berg Publishers, 1991): 197.
 26. Ibid.
 27. Quoted in David M. O'Brien's Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power
 and Governmental Accountability, 2nd ed. Vol. I (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995):
 114.
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 question, besides deference to the political branches. The court sometimes
 lacks information and resources needed to make an informed decision.
 And in some areas, especially foreign policy and international relations,
 the court lacks appropriate standards for resolving disputes or the means
 to enforce its decision.28
 In federal Indian affairs, however, the Supreme Court has used the
 political question doctrine in many cases,29 often in conjunction with the
 congressional plenary power doctrine,30 to either restrict or disavow
 Indian rights and in some cases to even deny Indians a legal venue to have
 their grievances heard. The political question doctrine, first used expressly
 in Indian law in U.S. v. Rogers,31 was used most frequently during the
 allotment and assimilation years from the 1880s to the early 1920s, when
 the court was most deferential to the legislature and when the federal gov-
 ernment used a frontal and unabashed assault in an effort to Americanize
 native peoples.
 It was clear during the treaty making period-1778-1868-that
 Indian affairs, like foreign affairs, had been constitutionally delegated to
 Congress. Thus the power of judicial review was constrained to a similar
 extent as judicial power to review foreign affairs decisions were con-
 strained, so that "the federal government's power to make treaties with
 the Indians was considered a political question, beyond judicial examina-
 tion."32 So long as tribes remained largely independent and were dealt
 with as sovereigns via treaty making, the federal government's largely
 28. Ibid., p. 115.
 29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866); U.S. v. Old Settlers, 148
 U.S. 427 (1893); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); Cherokee Nation v.
 Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); U.S. v.
 Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903); Blackfeather v. U.S., 190 U.S. 368 (1903); Matter of Heff, 197
 U.S. 488 (1905); U.S. v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80 (1907); Tiger v. Western Investment Co.,
 221 U.S. 286 (1911); U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S.
 422 (1914); U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); U.S. v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452 (1917); Brader
 v. James, 246 U.S. 88 (1918); and U.S. v. Boylan, 265 Fed. 165 (1920).
 30. See, e.g., David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal
 Plenary Power,"' American Indian Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 349-368 for an
 analysis of this important and variegated term. In general it has three broad meanings: exclu-
 sive, preemptive, and unlimited-absolute. In Indian affairs, particularly during the period
 from the 1880s to the 1920s and later during the termination era of the 1950s and 1960s, it
 was usually defined as a congressional power which lacked any constitutional constraints.
 Congress, in short, had virtually unlimited authority to do whatever it wanted regarding trib-
 al lands, resources, or political rights.
 31. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
 32. Shattuck and Norgren, Partial Justice (1991): 123. Generally, this is accurate.
 However, I would suggest that even during this long period there was a qualitative differ-
 ence in the way Congress dealt with tribes versus its dealings in foreign affairs. This has to
 do with the unique political relationship that had already evolved, rooted in the political doc-
 trines of consent, good faith, and trust, as laid out in congressional policy pronouncements,
 supreme court cases like the Cherokee cases (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831 and
 Worcester v. Georgia, 1832), and presidential proclamations and annual messages in which
 the chief executive often acknowledged the federal government's moral obligations to pro-
 tect tribes.
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 unreviewable power to deal with tribes was justified.
 However, when treaty making with tribes terminated in 1871 and
 Indian nations began to be treated as domestic national entities, with the
 federal government bent on the allotment, the assimilation, and the chris-
 tianization of tribal persons; and as individual Indians were naturalized as
 American citizens, then the Court should have altered its stance towards
 tribes and individual Indians and strictly scrutinized congressional activi-
 ties regarding Indians. This should have been the case especially when
 those activities resulted in violations of Indian treaty rights. The Court, on
 the contrary, continued its extreme deference to the political branches and
 frequently cited the political question doctrine as justification when it
 chose to ignore what for tribes were substantive federal violations of
 Indian rights.33
 Examples of judicial deference in Indian affairs abound. In Thomas
 v. Gay (169 U.S. 264 (1897), the Court said, "it is well settled that an act
 of Congress may supersede a prior treaty and that any questions that may
 arise are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance, and must be met by the
 political department of the Government." And in the most famous case, to
 be discussed in more detail later, which spliced the political question doc-
 trine with the plenary power doctrine, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,34 the Court
 declared that Congress's plenary power vis-i-vis tribes "has always been
 deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial depart-
 ment of the government," and that regardless of the manner in which
 Congress dealt with tribes, "[i]n any event, as Congress possessed full
 power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the
 motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation."35
 The Supreme Court placed some limitation on the congressional ple-
 nary power doctrine in the 1914 decision, Perrin v. United States,36 by
 establishing the "pure arbitrariness" test. The Court, while affirming that
 Congress had tremendous authority over Indian affairs, nevertheless stat-
 ed that "[a]s the power is incident only to the presence of the Indians and
 their status as wards of the Government, it must be conceded that it does
 not go beyond what is reasonably essential for their protection, and that,
 to be effective, its exercise must not be purely arbitrary but founded upon
 some reasonable basis."37
 33. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
 Limitation," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 132 (1984): 195-288 for a good
 analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Congress. The Rehnquist
 Court generally is less deferential to the Congress than its predecessors in many areas of
 law, including Indian affairs, and has actually challenged Congress' presumption of com-
 merce power especially as it relates-or is seen as interfering with the rights of states to con-
 trol their affairs. Nevertheless, in Indian affairs, there remains a presumption on the part of
 the Court that the federal government, and particularly the Congress, has superior standing
 in relation to tribes and may act accordingly.
 34. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
 35. Ibid., p. 568.
 36. 232 U.S. 478.
 37. Ibid., p. 486.
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 The political question doctrine, however, remained a viable and
 largely unrestricted legal doctrine until it was disavowed in two late twen-
 tieth century cases: Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,38 and
 United States v. Sioux Nation.39 In Weeks the Court rejected the claim that
 congressional power over Indian property was so all encompassing as to
 render legislative acts not subject to judicial review. And in Sioux Nation,
 a case with important repercussions for Indian land rights, the political
 question doctrine was swept away as a legal mechanism the Court could
 rely on to deny Indians a legal forum. As Justice Harry Blackmun said,
 "the doctrine was expressly laid to rest in Delaware . . ." and "the pre-
 sumption of congressional good faith has little to commend it as an endur-
 ing principle for deciding questions of the kind presented here."40
 The Supreme Court, then, has the constitutional authority to interpret
 Indian treaty rights, and should be available as a forum to which aggriev-
 ed Indian tribes or tribal members can take their treaty rights complaints.
 The Supreme Courts does not, however, have the constitutional authority
 to explicitly, and certainly does not have the authority to impliedly, abro-
 gate those rights. The power of abrogation remains a political question.
 JUDICIAL POWER AND IMPLIED REPEALS
 The Supreme Court has never asserted that it has the power express-
 ly to abrogate treaty rights. The court has instead consistently recognized
 that only the political branches may modify or abrogate treaty rights. As
 was said in U.S. v. Old Settlers41 in 1893, "unquestionably a treaty may
 be modified or abrogated by an Act of Congress, but the power to make
 and unmake is essentially political and not judicial .. ." (p. 468). Thus, if
 the court lacks this greater, overt power, which it has recognized as
 belonging solely to Congress, on what legitimate basis can it assert that it
 has the lesser power to abrogate treaty rights by implication? Treaty inter-
 pretation, the art of deciding the meaning of language, which the court has
 the power to do, is one thing; treaty abrogation is a whole different matter.
 However, since the 1871 Supreme Court case The Cherokee
 Tobacco,42 the court has at times acted to abrogate expressed Indian treaty
 rights without specific authorization by the Congress. In The Cherokee
 Tobacco, Justice Swayne pitted the 10th article of the 1866 Cherokee
 Treaty with the United States against a section of the 1868 General
 Revenue law. He read in a congressional intent to abrogate the treaty right
 that was nowhere expressly stated.
 Article 10 stated that Cherokee citizens had the right to sell any
 product or merchandise without having to pay "any tax thereon which is
 38. 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977).
 39. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
 40. Ibid., p. 414-415.
 41. 148 U.S. 427.
 42. 11 Wall. 616.
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 now or may be levied by the United States on the quantity sold outside of
 the Indian Territory."43 The provision of the General Revenue law, by
 contrast, imposed taxes on liquor and tobacco products "produced any-
 where within the exterior boundaries of the United States."44 While there
 was no language in the revenue law or in the accompanying documentary
 record expressly or impliedly stating that this law would apply to Indian
 Country, Justice Swayne, speaking for a deeply divided court (3 justices
 concurred, 2 dissented, and 3 did not participate), said that the case came
 down to which of the two laws was superior. Swayne maintained that
 "undoubtedly one or the other must yield" since "the repugnancy is clear
 and they cannot stand together" (p. 620).
 Swayne went on to enunciate the infamous "last-in-time" principle,
 which has troubled tribes ever since. He observed that although the
 Constitution lacks language that might settle an alleged conflict between a
 treaty and a statute, it was clear to the court that "the question is not
 involved in any doubt as to its proper selection. A treaty may supersede a
 prior act of Congress and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty"
 (p. 621). This statement has proven to be a most disastrous legal rule.
 Two months earlier, in March 1871, Congress had attached a rider to an
 Indian Appropriation Act that squelched the Indian treaty process.45 With
 treaty-making terminated (although agreements continued to be made
 until the early 1900s), any act of Congress passed subsequent to March
 1871 could be interpreted as having overriden a preexisting Indian treaty
 right. Tribes were frozen in political limbo. They were no longer recog-
 nized as nations capable of formally treating with the federal government,
 yet they remained separate non-constitutional political entities.
 Justices Bradley and Davis noted, however, in a spirited dissent that
 Indian populations were to be treated as "autonomies" and, that being the
 case, "all laws of a general character passed by Congress will be consid-
 ered as not applying to the Indian territory, unless expressly men-
 tioned."46 The dissenting justices maintained that this was true because
 "an expressed law [like a treaty right to be exempt from taxation] creating
 certain rights and privileges is held never to be repealed by implication by
 any subsequent law couched in general terms nor by any expressed repeal
 of all laws inconsistent with such general law, unless the language be such
 as clearly to indicate intention of the legislature to reflect such a repeal."47
 Another decision which drew upon the implied repeal doctrine was
 the egregious ruling, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.48 This opinion holds great
 significance for federal Indian law because, among its precedents, it held
 1) that congressional plenary power had always been present and that
 43. 14 Stat., 799.
 44. 15 Stat., 167.
 45. 16 St. 544, 566.
 46. Ibid., p. 622.
 47. Ibid.
 48. 187 U.S. 553.
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 Congress' power over tribal property was unlimited; 2) that Indian treaties
 could be unilaterally abrogated; and 3) that congressional plenary power
 was not subject to judicial review because of the political question doc-
 trine. It warrants some historical analysis because of its importance to our
 discussion and because of its continuing use as precedent.
 INDIAN TERRITORY-INDIAN ASSIMILATION
 The Kiowa, Comanche, Apaches and several other southern plains
 tribes negotiated a treaty with the federally sponsored Indian Peace
 Commission in southern Kansas in 1867.49 This treaty, like many during
 that era, contained a specific clause regarding future Indian land cessions.
 Article 12 said that: "No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the
 reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of
 any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed and
 signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the
 same .... .50 Such a provision was intended to ease the concern of the
 Indians that federal representatives might in the future seek to gain control
 of Indian lands by manipulating a minority of the tribal membership.
 Gradually, as more whites settled in Indian Territory the pressure
 mounted to allot the lands of the tribes. In 1892 the three member
 Cherokee Commission (also known as the Jerome Commission), despite
 resistance by the Indians, concluded an allotment and land cession agree-
 ment with certain representatives of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
 (KCA) tribes. Although the commissioners secured a number of Indian
 signatures, the three-fourths provision was not met. Nevertheless, the con-
 troversial agreement was rushed to Washington, D.C. for congressional
 ratification.
 Almost immediately, over 300 KCA tribal members memorialized
 the Senate urging that body to disapprove the 1892 agreement because 1)
 the negotiating sessions had not been conducted in open council or with
 the knowledge of tribal leaders and 2) because many of the signatures had
 been obtained through misrepresentations, threats, and fraudulent means.
 Tribal consent, in other words, of the requisite number of Indians, had
 never been legitimately secured.
 More importantly, as the agreement wound its way through the con-
 gressional ratification process, a journey that took eight years to complete,
 Congress substantially revised the agreement prior to its enactment. These
 revisions were never submitted to the KCA tribes for their approval, as
 required by treaty provision. Nevertheless, on June 6, 1900, Congress rati-
 fied the amended agreement.
 Lone Wolf, also known as A-Kei-Quodle, was a principal chief of
 49. 15 Stat., 581. For good discussion of the treaty proceedings see Douglas C. Jones,
 The Treaty of Medicine Lodge: The Story of the Great Treaty Council as Told by
 Eyewitnesses (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966).
 50. 15 Stat., 581.
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 the Kiowa Nation, and he, along with several Comanche and Apache
 leaders, brought suit against the U.S. challenging the legality of Congress'
 actions. Lone Wolf sought a permanent injunction against congressional
 ratification of the 1900 agreement which allotted the KCA tribes lands, a
 loss of over 2 million acres in Indian Territory, and contended that the
 federal government had directly violated Article 12 of the 1867 treaty.
 Lone Wolf, supported and represented by the Philadelphia based
 Indian Rights Association, filed suit in the District of Columbia's
 Supreme Court in 1901. He lost and had his appeal rejected by the District
 Court of Appeals. The KCA then turned to the U.S. Supreme Court for
 justice. The Indians' hopes, however, and by implication, those of all
 tribes with treaty-based property rights, were crushed unanimously by the
 Court's ruling in 1903.
 THE SUPREME MERGER:
 IMPLIED PLENARY POWER AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
 Justice Edward D. White issued the opinion which was, shortly after
 its pronouncement, labeled by one startled U.S. Senator, Matthew Quey
 (R., Pennsylvania), the "Dred Scott decision No. 2 except that in this case
 the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine that
 the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect, and,
 that no treaty or contract made with him is binding."51
 The Court's unanimous opinion represented a perfect and crippling
 synthesis of the plenary power concept and the political question doctrine.
 The Court refused to even consider the tribes' core argument, that of
 "fraudulent misrepresentation" by government officials in securing Indian
 signatures. The justices also refused to consider the issue of the Senate's
 unilateral alteration of the 1892 agreement's provisions.
 The only question the Court considered was whether the Act of June
 6, 1900, was constitutional. Despite Lone Wolf's treaty and constitutional
 arguments, Justice White accepted the government attorneys' view that
 since Indians were "wards" their treaty-defined property rights had not
 vested. The Indians' claim, said White, "in effect ignores the status of the
 contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue
 to bear toward the government of the United States."52 White was retroac-
 tively bestowing wardship status on the tribes to make the abrogation of
 their treaty rights appear legal.
 In discussing congressional plenary power, White stated that: "To
 uphold the claim [of the Indians'] would be to adjudge that the indirect
 operation of the treaty was to materially limit and quality the controlling
 authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians,
 and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessity
 51. U.S. Congressional Record (1903): p. 2028.
 52. 187 U.S. 553, 564.
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 might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all
 power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained."53
 However, there was clearly no "emergency" present to justify this viola-
 tion. The congressional ratification process of the 1892 agreement had
 taken a full eight years to complete.
 The Court's discussion of Congress' allegedly implied power over
 tribal rights and resources is of special importance for our discussion.
 After citing previous cases in which the Court had equated Indian title
 with fee-simple title, White set up a situation in which he was able to cir-
 cumvent these prior opinions He said: "But in none of these cases was
 there involved a controversy between Indians and the government respect-
 ing the power of Congress to administer the property of the Indians."54
 This is correct, as written. Prior to this decision Congress had historically
 acknowledged that it had no right to challenge treaty-recognized Indian
 property rights. One of the cases cited, however, by White, Beecher v.
 Wetherby,55 had stated that the United States had a superior authority over
 Indians based on guardianship and that such authority "might be implied,
 even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians."56
 This "abrogation by implication" argument allowed White to then falsely
 assert that congressional "plenary power over the tribal relations of the
 Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
 power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to the control
 of the judicial department of the government."57
 White said that Congress "always" had plenary authority not subject
 to judicial review because the Court was intent on legitimating the con-
 gressionally directed breakdown of communally held tribal lands which,
 the Court had determined, was essential before Euro-American civiliza-
 tion could be approximated by Indians. Such judicial intent to sanction the
 abrogation of treaty rights, notwithstanding the KCA tribes' well articu-
 lated concerns about lost land, lost rights, and denied sovereignty, is evi-
 dent in the following passage where White calmly describes the traumatic
 breakup of Indian communal lands into individualized allotted parcels as
 "a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the
 property of those who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the
 wards of the government."58
 Finally, the Court attempted to lessen the damage its sanctioning of
 Congress' power to bludgeon treaty-recognized property rights had
 caused by stating that the government's actions were those of a "Christian
 people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race" and that the
 Congress, the Court was presuming, was acting "in perfect good faith"
 53. Ibid.
 54. Ibid., p. 565.
 55. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
 56. 187 U.S. 565.
 57. Ibid.
 58. Ibid., p. 568.
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 with the Indians and was using its "best judgment in the premises."59 The
 Court had to "presume" that Congress had acted in good faith in dealing
 with the tribes because subsequent to the treaties' ratification it could find
 no historical or legal assurance to show that Congress had "in reality"
 acted in good faith.
 The court's use of the implied repeal doctrine, or the closely related
 term, "implicit divestiture,"60 has increased since the mid- 1970s in feder-
 al cases such as Decoteau v. District Court,61 Rosebud Sioux v. Kneip,62
 U.S. v. Dion,63 Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian
 Tribe,64 South Dakota v. Bourland,65 and Hagen v. Utah.66 The increased
 use of the doctrine may be attributed to the Supreme Court's ideological
 turn towards a radical brand of conservatism combined with a resurgence
 of states' rights. Recently, the court frequently has favored states' rights
 as being superior to Indian treaty rights.67
 PRECEDENT AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS
 In 1880 a federal district court in United States v. Berry,68 held that
 an Indian treaty "by its terms was to be permanent, and the rights con-
 ferred thereby were not to be taken away without the consent of the
 Indian." While conceding that congress had the power of repeal, the judge
 said "it is clear to my mind that such repeal can only be enacted in
 expressed terms, or by such language as imports a clear purpose on the
 part of congress to effect that end."
 In 1883 the Supreme Court turned its attention to the doctrine of
 implied repeals in the important Indian criminal law case Ex parte Crow
 Dog.69 In Crow Dog the Supreme Court unanimously held that one of a
 59. Ibid.
 60. The related phrase that tribes were "implicitly divested" of certain sovereign powers
 by their geographic incorporation and allegedly dependent relationship to the federal govern-
 ment was developed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191
 (1978).
 61. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
 62. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
 63. 106 S.Ct. 2216 (1986).
 64. 473 U.S. 753 (1985).
 65. 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
 66. 1145 S.Ct. 958 (1994).
 67. See, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
 (1989); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
 408 (1989); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
 Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); and
 Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). However, in the spring of 1999 the Supreme
 Court rendered two decisions that effectively reaffirmed Indian treaty rights against states'
 rights: Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 119 S.Ct. 1187 and Puget Sound
 Shellfish Growers v. United States, 1999 U.S. Lexis, 2504.
 68. 4 Fed. 779 (D.C. Colo. 1880).
 69. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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 tribe's remaining sovereign powers was exclusive criminal jurisdiction
 over its own members. The government, in seeking to execute Crow Dog
 for the killing of another Sioux, Spotted Tail, had argued that it had crimi-
 nal jurisdiction based on articles 1, 2, and 5 of the 1868 Sioux Treaty with
 the U.S., which dealt with the establishment of peace, the creation of the
 reservation, and the agent's appointment, and on Article 8 of the federal
 government's 1877 agreement with the Sioux Nation which said, "And
 Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to them an orderly gov-
 ernment; they shall be subject to the laws of the U.S., and each individual
 shall be protected in his rights of property, person, and life."70
 The court disagreed, citing the fact that section 2146 of the Revised
 Statutes, which excluded from the jurisdiction of the U.S. criminal cases
 in Indian Country by one Indian against another, had never been expressly
 repealed. The Sioux Nation's right of self-government, the court insisted,
 necessarily entailed "the regulation by themselves of their own domestic
 affairs, [including] the maintenance of order and peace among their own
 members by the administration of their own laws and customs."71
 Important for our purposes is the court's detailed discussion of the
 implied repeal doctrine, which Justice Matthews and a unanimous court
 emphatically rebuffed:
 It must be remembered that the question before us is whether the express letter of
 [section] 2146 of the Revised Statutes, which excludes from the jurisdiction of
 the United States the case of a crime committed in the Indian country by one
 Indian against the person or property of another Indian, has been repealed. If not,
 it is in force and applies to the present case. The treaty of 1868 and the agreement
 and act of Congress of 1877, it is admitted, do not repeal it by any express words.
 What we have said is sufficient at least to show that they do not work a repeal by
 necessary implication ... Implied repeals are not favored. The implication must
 be necessary. There must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the
 new laws and those of the old.72 (emphasis added)
 Justice Matthews then elaborated on the important principle that specific
 and express rights are not to be interpreted as being overruled by general
 acts unless there is explicit reference to them:
 The language of the exception is special and express; the words relied on as a
 repeal are general and inconclusive. The rule is generalia specialibus non
 derogant. 'The general principle to be applied,' ... 'to the construction of acts of
 Parliament is that a general act is not to be construed to repeal a previous particu-
 lar act, unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation on the
 subject, or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two acts standing
 together.' 'And the reason is,' . . .'that the legislature having had its attention
 directed to a special subject, and having observed all the circumstances of the
 case and provided for them, does not intend by a general enactment afterwards to
 derogate from its own act when it makes no special mention of its intention so to
 do.'73 [emphasis his]
 70. Ibid., p. 568.
 71. Ibid.
 72. Ibid., p. 570.
 73. Ibid., p. 571.
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 More recently, the Supreme Court has insisted in several important
 cases, Menominee Tribe v. U.S.,74 Washington v. Fishing Vessel
 Association,75 and Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa,76 that the
 government's intent to abrogate Indian treaty provisions must be clear and
 unequivocal. This "clear and plain" standard also applies to non-treaty
 situations if the federal action threatens tribal rights created via statute,
 aboriginal title, or executive orders.77
 There have actually been very few cases where the U.S. Congress or
 the President officially78 exercised the power legislatively or administra-
 tively to abrogate treaties-Indian or international. The procedure, either
 an act of Congress, or some form of direct presidential action, like a
 proclamation, must be quite explicit. The following are two examples of
 official international treaty abrogation.
 EXPRESS REPEALS OF FOREIGN TREATIES
 First, on July 7, 1798, Congress enacted a law that directly abrogated
 treaties between the United States and France. The law was entitled "An
 act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France, no longer
 obligatory on the U.S." Congress declared that "whereas the treaties con-
 cluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly violat-
 74. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
 75. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
 76. 119 S.Ct. 1187 (1999).
 77. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Sante Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339
 (1941) and Bryan v. Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
 78. That is not to say that many treaties or provisions of specific treaties have not been
 "unofficially" violated. It is a well known fact that the federal government has on many
 occasions acted to abrogate or diminish the rights of other nations, including tribal nations,
 by either not ratifying previously negotiated treaties (e.g., the 18 treaties negotiated between
 the federal government and various California tribes); or by failing to enact necessary legis-
 lation to implement particular treaty provisions; or by failing to carry out treaty mandates
 (e.g., fishing rights of Washington, Oregon, and Wisconsin tribal members); or by enacting
 later laws which implicitly overrode earlier treaty rights (Kiowa, Comanche, and Apaches in
 Oklahoma).
 As regards Indian treaties, Vine Deloria, in response to a query by Senator Daniel Inouye
 in 1987, on whether any Indian treaties had not been violated, said "there are technical attor-
 neys' interpretations which is that various articles are specifically violated. I think the spirit
 of all the treaties or the pledge of good faith between Indians and the U.S.-that spirit has
 certainly long since been destroyed" (U.S. Senate. Hearing Before the Select Committee on
 Indian Affairs, on S. Concurrent Resolution 76. 100th Congress., 1st sess., (Washington,
 D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988): 29.
 Regarding U.S. violations of foreign treaties, see Christopher Joyner's, article,
 "International Law" in Peter Schraeder, Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in
 the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992): 229-244, in which he
 details how the U.S. has intervened in the affairs of many Third World countries despite its
 avowed support of the doctrine of non-intervention. Examples include U.S. intervention in
 Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973, Granada
 in 1983, and Panama in 1989. Joyner shows how between 1900 and 1930 the U.S. inter-
 vened militarily on some 60 occasions in several Caribbean and Central American states.
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 ed on the part of the French government ... [a]nd whereas, under authori-
 ty of the French government, there is yet pursued against the United
 States, a system of predatory violence, infracting the said treaties, and
 hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation .. ." it was held that
 "the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations
 of the treaties, and of the consular convention . .. and that the same shall
 not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or cit-
 izens of the United States."79
 Second, in 1978 President Jimmy Carter terminated a Mutual
 Defense treaty with Taiwan. The Senate considered a resolution that
 would have required the approval of the Senate or both houses of
 Congress before the President could terminate any defense treaty, but
 final action was never taken on the measure. A federal district court in
 1979 in Goldwater v. Carter,80 held that some form of congressional con-
 currence was required before the abrogation of a treaty, but this was over-
 turned by an appellate court ruling,81 which was then affirmed late in
 1979 by the Supreme Court82 because of Congress' failure to confront the
 President directly. The Supreme Court, in fact, split along several lines,
 thus providing no clear consensus on future treaty terminations by the
 chief executive. Moreover, Congress has not yet enacted legislation defin-
 ing appropriate rules for the executive and legislature on this matter.83
 EXPRESS CONGRESSIONAL REPEAL OF INDIAN TREATIES
 Not since the end of the Nineteenth century, when Congress effec-
 tively usurped the presidential treaty-making power insofar as Indian
 treaties were concerned by terminating the federal government's contin-
 ued negotiation of any additional Indian treaties,84 have American presi-
 79. 2 St. 578.
 80. 481 F.Supp. 949, 963-64.
 81. 617 F.2d 697 (1979).
 82. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
 83. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers & Federalism, vol. I (New
 York: McGraw Hill, 1990): 309.
 84. See, the Indian treaty-termination rider attached to the 1871 Indian Appropriation
 Act, which declared that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the U.S.
 shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
 the U.S. may contract by treaty. This measure, however, recognized the ongoing validity of
 previously ratified Indian treaties (16 St. 544, 566).
 Consult Francis P. Prucha's, American Indian Treaties (Berkeley, CA: University of
 California Press, 1995) for detailed examination of this intense and critical period. And see
 George W. Rice, "Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. Sec. 77: the End of Sovereignty or a Self-
 Limitation of Contractual Ability?" American Indian Law Review, vol. 5 (1977): 239-253,
 who persuasively argues that Congress' action ending treaty making with tribes is of ques-
 tionable constitutionality. More importantly, the practice of treaty making, though termed
 agreements, continued from 1872 to 1914. The only difference between the two is that
 agreements require ratification by both Houses, while treaties need only be ratified by the
 Senate.
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 dents had a significant role in Indian treaty (or agreement) negotiation or
 interpretation. And as a result of the recent supreme court ruling,
 Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct. 1187)
 (1999), it is clear that the president lacks the power via executive order to
 revoke preexisting Indian treaty rights. Thus my primary focus insofar as
 explicit Indian treaty abrogation is concerned is on the process used by
 Congress expressly to terminate Indian treaties.
 The most vivid and direct congressional action abrogating an Indian
 treaty occurred as a result of the outbreak of war between the Santee
 Sioux and white settlers in Minnesota in 1862. Several hundred whites
 were killed by Sioux who rose up in arms after having been deprived of
 their lifestyle and some of their treaty entitlements by government
 agents.85 The U.S. Army responded quickly, and soon the Santee were
 defeated. General Henry Sibley, the militia commander in Minnesota and
 a prominent political figure in the state, ordered a court martial for several
 hundred of the Sioux. Three hundred Santee were sentenced to hang,
 regardless of their level of involvement in the outbreak of violence.
 President Lincoln, however, commuted the death sentences of all but 40
 of the Indians. Eventually, 38 were hanged-the largest mass execution in
 U.S. history.
 Congress responded to the eruption by enacting a law on July 5,
 1862, which said that "whenever the tribal organization of any Indian
 tribe is in actual hostility to the United States, the President is authorized,
 by proclamation, to declare all treaties with such tribe abrogated by such
 tribe, if in his opinion the same can be done consistently with good faith
 and legal and national obligations."86 In what Francis Prucha called "an
 unprecedented move," Congress canceled certain provisions of earlier
 treaties with the Sioux and the following year, February 16, 1863, enacted
 a law declaring that "all treaties with the Sisseton," and several other
 bands of Sioux, were "abrogated and annulled, so far as said treaties or
 any of them purport to impose any future obligation on the United
 States."87
 In a second example, Congress explicitly abrogated a preexisting
 Indian treaty right with an act passed February 28, 1877, which also
 involved the Sioux. In this act, which ratified an agreement with some
 Sioux bands and the Northern Arapaho and Cheyenne, Congress clearly
 and unequivocally abrogated Article 16 of the 1868 Sioux treaty, which
 had guaranteed the Sioux unceded territory, permitted no whites in their
 borders without tribal consent, and required the U.S. to abandon all mili-
 tary posts and close roads. Congress succinctly said: "And Article 16 of
 the said treaty is hereby abrogated."
 Finally, in 1895 Congress acted to "annul" and "disapprove" a
 85. Edward Lazarus, Black Hills/White Justice (New York: Harper Collins Publishers,
 1991): 27-28.
 86. 12 St. 528.
 87. 12 St. 652-54.
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 November 13, 1888 treaty (Congress in the legislation referred to this
 agreement88 as a treaty, not an agreement) the United States had signed
 with the Southern Utes of Colorado in favor of an earlier June 15, 1880
 treaty made with the tribe which called for the allotment of their lands.89
 This act also contained a consent provision in which Congress declared
 that the act would be inoperative until it was accepted by a majority of the
 adult male Indians on the reservation.
 In short, when the federal government determines officially to abro-
 gate an Indian treaty or specific provisions of a treaty, it acts invariably
 through the Congress which is authorized to oversee federal Indian
 affairs. The legislature exercises this power openly and unambiguously,
 and usually only after the legislature has determined that the tribe in ques-
 tion has somehow engaged in an act or a set of actions that warrants the
 termination of the specific treaty (e.g., the Santee eruption against local
 settlers, which was deemed a violation of their treaty agreement with the
 federal government not to engage in hostilities toward neighboring
 whites).
 EXPRESS CONGRESSIONAL MODIFICATION OF PRIOR
 TREATIES/AGREEMENTS
 On other specific occasions when Congress has sought to modify or
 amend existing Indian treaties or agreements, it has also acted unequivo-
 cally by enacting specific laws which have adjusted or amended the previ-
 ous negotiated arrangements.
 Gradually, by the late 1860s, the United States began to add specific
 provisions to many Indian treaties which guaranteed to the tribal partici-
 pants that there would be no cession of reservation land without the
 express written consent of a majority (usually three-fourths) of adult
 males.90 We have already discussed how in certain cases, most famously
 the 1867 Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache treaty provision which resulted
 in the devastating Lone Wolf precedent, that this consent provision was
 sometimes brushed aside or abused by federal officials.
 Notwithstanding this important case and its bleak precedent, there
 are many other instances where the Congress acted to secure tribal con-
 sent before moving to acquire Indian lands or terminate specific treaty
 rights, or by acting only after it had passed an express act which had the
 effect of modifying or amending a prior treaty or agreement.
 For example, on June 30, 1864,91 Congress enacted a law which
 88. This is technically what all bilateral negotiations between tribes and the U.S. were
 termed after the 1871 treaty termination law.
 89. 28 St. 677.
 90. See, e.g., Article 8 of the 1868 treaty between the Northern Cheyenne, Northern
 Arapahoe and the United States (15 Stat., 655); and Article 10 of the 1868 Navajo Treaty
 with the United States (15 Stat., 667).
 91. 13 Stat., 324.
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 authorized the president to negotiate with the Confederated Tribes of
 Oregon in an effort to have them relinquish certain off-reservation hunt-
 ing, fishing, and gathering rights the tribes had retained in an 1859 treaty.
 The president was authorized by Congress to defray the expenses of the
 treaty negotiations and to offer the tribes $5,000 for cession of those
 rights.
 In 1872, Congress passed an act92 to implement certain provisions of
 the 1866 Cherokee Treaty having to do with the so-called "Cherokee
 Strip" lands owned by the Cherokee Nation in Kansas. Those lands were
 to be surveyed and sold but only after the sale had been approved by the
 Cherokee National Council or by a duly authorized Cherokee delegation.
 In yet another example, Congress passed a measure in 187493 dealing
 with the federal government's efforts to fulfill the eighth article of the
 treaty between the Creek and Seminole Indians which had been concluded
 in 1856. Article 8 authorized the federal government to expend $5,000
 annually for the "comfort, civilization, and improvement" of the Indians.
 However, in a proviso, Congress states that "the consent of said tribe to
 such expenditures and payment shall be first obtained."
 The Osage Tribe also received congressional assurances94 that their
 consent would be obtained before their Kansas lands, known as the Osage
 Indian trust and diminished reserved lands, were sold at public auction to
 the highest bidder. These sales were not to occur "until at least two-thirds
 of the adult males" agreed to the provisions outlined by Congress.
 Francis P. Prucha claims that "Indian consent, however, gradually
 disappeared as a major element" of federal Indian policy after the 1880s,
 largely as a result of the force of the February 8, 1887 General Allotment
 Act95 which was the policy directive issued by Congress to hasten the
 individualization of Indian communal land through the allotment of indi-
 vidual shares to Indian families and members. On a broad level, he is
 essentially correct because there is significant evidence that many tribes
 fought valiantly-and never gave their consent freely-to avoid the
 breakdown of their cultures and the erosion of their land bases, only to
 have the federal government push ahead and proceed with detribalization
 and allotment.
 Nevertheless, while federal pursuit of American Indian assimilation
 was an overwhelming force from which tribes could not extricate them-
 selves, one still finds clear examples where Congress persisted in obtain-
 ing tribal consent before enforcing or implementing agreement provisions,
 or, at the least, Congress, before modifying treaties or agreements, would
 pass subsequent acts to carry out their purpose.
 For instance, on July 1, 1902, Congress passed an act to accept, rati-
 fy, and confirm the allotment agreement and memorial that had been pro-
 92. 17 Stat., 98.
 93. 18 Stat., 29.
 94. 21 Stat., 509.
 95. 24 Stat., 388.
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 posed by the Kansas or Kaw Tribe of Oklahoma Territory.96 Article 13
 contained the consent provision: "The said Kansas or Kaw Indians hereby
 memorialize Congress to ratify and confirm this agreement and to make
 provision for carrying it into effect: Provided, that if any material amend-
 ments are made in this agreement by Congress the same shall not become
 effective until such amendments are approved by a majority of the adult
 members of the . . . tribe. .. ." The Kaw, like most other tribes, were
 under enormous pressure to have their lands allotted. As Commissioner of
 Indian Affairs (CIA), W.A. Jones, stated in his report accompanying the
 Kaw agreement: "The agreement is in entire harmony with the views of
 this [CIA] office ... The Indian must ultimately be thrown upon his own
 resources, and this agreement proposes to do this for the Kaw tribe."97
 The consent provision, however, was designed to provide the Indians with
 some assurance that their rights would not be unilaterally altered by
 Congress, though it was clear that they were going to be altered.
 The 1903 Lone Wolf decision had established an ominous precedent
 in Indian affairs: that Congress could act to unilaterally abrogate Indian
 treaty rights over the protests of Indians by exercising an unreviewable
 plenary power over Indian property. And Prucha states in his most recent
 work, American Indian Treaties, that "after the Lone Wolf decision the
 idea of requiring Indian consent for the disposition of their lands was
 largely discarded in regard to statutes as well as to agreements, and
 Congress unilaterally provided for the sale of surplus lands remaining
 after allotments had been completed."98
 Prucha cites as evidence a 1901 agreement with the Rosebud Sioux
 for the sale of their unallotted lands in which the government's Indian
 Inspector, James McLaughlin, properly secured the signatures of three-
 fourths of the adult Sioux males for the land cession. This agreement,
 however, was later amended and ratified by Congress in 1904 in a way
 that eliminated the requirement to secure Indian consent. The House
 Committee on Indian Affairs which made the changes in the agreement
 which called for the elimination of the need to get Indian consent justified
 their action largely on the basis of the Lone Wolf opinion.99
 Although it is true that Congress less frequently acted to gain Indian
 consent before allotting Indian reservations or selling the surplus lands
 left after allotment, the fact remains that the legislature, not the judiciary,
 still had to formally act when it voted on measures that modified and rati-
 fied prior Indian treaties or agreements. One final example makes this
 point quite clearly. On June 11, 1934, exactly one week before the com-
 96. 32 Stat., 636.
 97. U.S. Congress. House. "Agreement and Memorial of the Kansas (or Kaw) Indians of
 Oklahoma." Document No. 452, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., March 11, 1902 (Washington, D.C.:
 Government Printing Office, 1903): 3.
 98. Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly
 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994): 356-57.
 99. Ibid., p. 357.
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 prehensive Indian reform measure, the Indian Reorganization Act,100
 which helped to revitalize tribes economically, politically, and culturally,
 Congress enacted an act101 "to modify the effect of certain Chippewa
 Indian treaties . . ." and expressly amended article 7 of two Chippewa
 treaties-February 22, 1853 and September 30, 1854-which centered for
 jurisdictional purposes on defining what was "Indian Country." Again, the
 important point is that this modification of treaty rights required an
 express and unequivocal statement by the Congress which had first nego-
 tiated and ratified the original treaties.
 The data show, therefore, that on these occasions when the Congress
 has officially acted to expressly abrogate or modify indigenous treaties it
 has done so by formally acting through the legislative process and some-
 times sought tribal consent before changing the treaty/agreement. Most
 commentators and ample litigation confirm that Congress may, when it is
 deemed extremely important or vital to the national interest, enact a pre-
 cise law abrogating (or amending) a prior treaty (agreement) or treaty
 (agreement) provision. Officially, the power to unilaterally abrogate
 Indian treaties has not been wielded often. This is because, as Attorney
 General Caleb Cushing noted in 1854 in an opinion on the land rights of
 several Kansas Territory tribes:
 Let me not be understood as acceding to the doctrine, that all stipulations of
 treaties are subject to be repealed or modified at any time by act of Congress.
 Without going into that question here, it suffices to remark that every treaty is an
 express compact, in the most solemn form in which the United States can make a
 compact. Not to observe a treaty, is to violate a deliberate and express engage-
 ment. To violate such engagements of a treaty with any foreign power affords, of
 course, good cause of war.102
 Cushing went on to note, however, that there were some important
 distinctions between Indian treaties and treaties with foreign nations. As
 he observed, "[e]xamples may be cited of acts of Congress, which operate
 so as to modify or amend treaties with Indians. As their sovereign and
 their guardian, we have occasionally assumed to do this, acting in their
 interest and our own, and not, in such cases, violating engagements with
 them, but seeking to give a more beneficial effect to such engagements.
 For though they be weak, and we strong,-they subjects and we mas-
 ters,-yet they are not the less entitled to the exercise towards them of the
 most scrupulous good faith on the part of the United States."103 In other
 words, the federal government was legally and morally bound to uphold
 Indian treaties not only because they were important political covenants,
 but also because of the added trust/moral dimension: the federal govern-
 ment, in asserting its physical superiority, had an additional set of respon-
 sibilities to protect the lands and interests of Indians.
 100. 48 Stat., 984.
 101. 48 Stat., 927.
 102. U.S. Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, Vol. VI
 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1854): 663-64.
 103. Ibid., p. 664.
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 The treaty power, as Attorney General Amos T. Akerman stated in
 1870, "binding the will of the nation, must, within its constitutional limits,
 be paramount to the legislative power which is that will."104 Tribes, of
 course, after a time, declined and in some cases surrendered their right to
 wage war by negotiating many treaties with the United States in which
 they reluctantly agreed to reduced lands and peace and amity with the
 United States in exchange for continued recognition of their sovereignty
 and all other reserved rights. Hence, although there are clearly some
 important distinctions between U.S. treaties with foreign powers and U.S.
 treaties with indigenous powers (their geographic proximity, the assumed
 and declared trust and plenary doctrines, military disadvantages, etc.), it
 must not be assumed that these differences outweigh the legal compara-
 bility of the documents. As a federal court held in Turner v. American
 Baptist Missionary Union,105 "it is contended that a treaty with Indian
 tribes, has not the same dignity or effect, as a treaty with a foreign and
 independent nation. This distinction is not authorized by the Constitution.
 ... They are treaties, within the meaning of the Constitution, and, as such,
 are the supreme laws of the land" (p. 346).
 CONCLUSION
 I have argued that the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority
 to abrogate specific treaty rights by implication or to divest Indian tribes
 of their rights; such power is constitutionally vested and on a few occa-
 sions has been expressly wielded by the U.S. Congress. From an indige-
 nous perspective, corroborated by a plethora of federal policy, judicial
 opinions, and some historical practice, the Supreme Court's decision in
 The Kansas Indians,106 contains the most reasonable articulation of how
 Indian treaties/agreements may be changed. The Court held that Indian
 treaties and the rights affirmed or created by treaty provisions may be
 modified, amended, or terminated only as a result of bilateral treaty stipu-
 lations, purchase, or the voluntary abandonment of the tribal organization.
 The evidence shows that the United States on a number of occasions
 mutually agreed to modify or amend treaties and sought on some occa-
 sions to purchase Indian treaty rights. And while congressional power
 over tribal lands and rights was far more oppressive after the Lone Wolf
 decision, since Congress regularly acted as if tribal consent was no longer
 required, it was still federal policy that changes in treaty/agreement rights
 required the enactment of congressional statutes with exact language
 specifying which treaty provision was to be modified or eliminated.
 The specification of how treaty rights could be changed to allow
 both parties to remain within the paradigm of good faith is found in lan-
 guage of the federal district court ruling in the important water rights case,
 104. Ibid., vol. 13 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1873): 358.
 105. 24 Fed.Cas. 344 (1852).
 106. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
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 Winters v. United States,107 in which Judge Hawley said, "We must pre-
 sume that the government and the Indian, in agreeing to the terms of the
 treaty, acted in the utmost good faith toward each other; that they both
 understood its meaning, purpose, and object."los
 In other words, the political/moral principle of "utmost good faith,"
 when combined with the trust doctrine, requires that both parties work to
 fulfill not only the letter but especially the spirit of the treaties negotiated.
 In the event that there is to be a modification or abrogation of the treaty
 arrangement, it is to be carried out mutually, consensually, and voluntarily
 through the same political/diplomatic channels that led to the treaty's cre-
 ation in the first instance. On those few occasions when the federal gov-
 ernment has acted formally to abrogate treaties or provisions of treaties,
 Congress has wielded the abrogating power, but even then only through
 the express wording in a statute. And in the more numerous cases where
 Congress negotiated agreements and then sought to modify or amend
 them, it also passed specific legislation identifying what its intention was,
 and frequently sought Indian consent to concur with the change.
 It is not the province of the Supreme Court to generate a congres-
 sional intent and then to unilaterally or by implication repeal specific
 treaty rights that have been negotiated and ratified through political chan-
 nels by tribal nations and their political leaders and the U.S. government
 and its political leaders. Indian treaties, ultimately, are vital diplomatic
 arrangements between nations. And while they may be abrogated by the
 Congress (and the tribes, for that matter), depending on the confluence of
 particular if ill-defined circumstances, because of the distinctive trust and
 good faith doctrines, and exclusive authority of Congress with regards to
 Indian affairs, there must be a clear and specific intent to abrogate which
 must be carried out by those political branches which oversee the United
 States relationship with tribes. When alleged conflicts erupt between spe-
 cific Indian treaty provisions and later congressional or state statutes, the
 principal task of the Supreme Court must be to uphold the honor and will
 of the nation, as outlined in the treaty, and interpret the conflicting statute
 in a way that conforms to the national will and the federal government's
 trust obligations to tribes.
 107. 143 Fed. Reporter 740 (1906).
 108. Ibid., p. 745.
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